<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd" xmlns:googleplay="http://www.google.com/schemas/play-podcasts/1.0"><channel><title><![CDATA[Public Reason]]></title><description><![CDATA[Inside the ideas driving our political world.]]></description><link>https://www.public-reason.com</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 02:03:04 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://www.public-reason.com/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><copyright><![CDATA[Zack Beauchamp]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[zackbeauchamp@substack.com]]></webMaster><itunes:owner><itunes:email><![CDATA[zackbeauchamp@substack.com]]></itunes:email><itunes:name><![CDATA[Zack Beauchamp]]></itunes:name></itunes:owner><itunes:author><![CDATA[Zack Beauchamp]]></itunes:author><googleplay:owner><![CDATA[zackbeauchamp@substack.com]]></googleplay:owner><googleplay:email><![CDATA[zackbeauchamp@substack.com]]></googleplay:email><googleplay:author><![CDATA[Zack Beauchamp]]></googleplay:author><itunes:block><![CDATA[Yes]]></itunes:block><item><title><![CDATA[Might makes wrong]]></title><description><![CDATA[The Trump administration&#8217;s new catchphrase &#8212; &#8220;stop quoting laws to men with swords&#8221; &#8212; actually explains their own failure.]]></description><link>https://www.public-reason.com/p/might-makes-wrong</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.public-reason.com/p/might-makes-wrong</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Zack Beauchamp]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 19:08:24 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!n1WN!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1c568700-7b8b-465e-a8bb-bc6932aa67fb_4096x2567.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!n1WN!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1c568700-7b8b-465e-a8bb-bc6932aa67fb_4096x2567.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!n1WN!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1c568700-7b8b-465e-a8bb-bc6932aa67fb_4096x2567.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!n1WN!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1c568700-7b8b-465e-a8bb-bc6932aa67fb_4096x2567.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!n1WN!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1c568700-7b8b-465e-a8bb-bc6932aa67fb_4096x2567.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!n1WN!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1c568700-7b8b-465e-a8bb-bc6932aa67fb_4096x2567.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!n1WN!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1c568700-7b8b-465e-a8bb-bc6932aa67fb_4096x2567.jpeg" width="1456" height="912" 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srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!n1WN!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1c568700-7b8b-465e-a8bb-bc6932aa67fb_4096x2567.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!n1WN!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1c568700-7b8b-465e-a8bb-bc6932aa67fb_4096x2567.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!n1WN!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1c568700-7b8b-465e-a8bb-bc6932aa67fb_4096x2567.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!n1WN!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1c568700-7b8b-465e-a8bb-bc6932aa67fb_4096x2567.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-tqxFUX" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">The Stabbing of Pompey, by <a href="https://www.nga.gov/artworks/90936-stabbing-pompey">Willem Basse</a>.</figcaption></figure></div><p>The Trump administration has a new catchphrase: &#8220;stop quoting laws to men with swords.&#8221;</p><p>It started with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who <a href="https://x.com/PeteHegseth/status/2121773113239073260">used the line in a Friday speech</a> dismissing the authority of the International Criminal Court. It was <a href="https://x.com/PeteHegseth/status/2121773113239073260">picked up the next day</a> by Secretary of Defense<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> Pete Hegseth, who seems to enjoy this sort of masculine sloganeering far more than the actual work of running the Pentagon.</p><p>Though the line sounds like it was ripped from a Mussolini speech, it in fact originated with a somewhat older Italian: the Roman general Pompey. When the Sicilian city of Messana rebuffed his effort to impose control during a civil war, citing ancient Roman law, Pompey ignored them, <a href="https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Plutarch/Lives/Pompey*.html">offering the now-famous quip</a> about laws and swords as justification.</p><p>Pompey would ultimately die by his own maxim.</p><p>Defeated by Caesar in the Battle of Pharsalus, he fled to Egypt and sought refuge with Ptolemy XIII. Believing the Egyptian king owed him a debt, Pompey expected Ptolemy to welcome him. Instead, Ptolemy&#8217;s agents stabbed him to death as he attempted to get off the boat.</p><p>This is, I think, not just accidentally embarrassing. It&#8217;s an irony<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> that speaks to a basic void at the heart of the Trump administration&#8217;s worldview: not just on foreign policy, but politics as a whole. It is &#8212; more irony here &#8212; a failure to understand the real nature of power.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Public Reason is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><h3>&#8220;The realism of fools&#8221;</h3><p>The Rubio-Hegseth line is not some kind of one-off. Back in January, when the Trump administration was threatening to take Greenland from Denmark, now-chief of staff Stephen Miller described the world in basically the same fashion &#8212; telling Jake Tapper that global politics is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/06/us/politics/stephen-miller-foreign-policy.html">ultimately nothing but a contest of brute strength</a>.</p><p>&#8220;We live in a world in which you can talk all you want about international niceties and everything else, but we live in a world&#8230;that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power,&#8221; he said. &#8220;These are the iron laws of the world since the beginning of time.&#8221;</p><p>The Trump administration has lived by Miller&#8217;s doctrine. The war in Iran, the boat strikes in the Caribbean, the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2026/06/how-do-us-third-country-removals-work-and-are-they-legal/">deportation of migrants to dangerous countries</a>, the annexation threats against Greenland and Canada &#8212; all of these attack pretty fundamental principles of international law. And not just law: perhaps more importantly, they attack the basic agreements and expectations that defined America&#8217;s relationship with the rest of the world. NATO allies can no longer expect that the US will come to their aid, or even refrain from outright attacks on their sovereignty. Trade partners no longer can expect any stability in US tariff levels. Even countries under attack from America&#8217;s enemies can no longer look to Washington for help.</p><p>The basic Trump argument here is one of self-interest. Trade agreements, alliance treaties, and international law are all constraints that prevent a superpower from acting in its people&#8217;s best interests. The United States can and should simply demand what it wants from others, using its enormous economic and military leverage to force others to give it what it wants. What happens to foreigners is ultimately of no concern; we care about Utah, not Ukraine.</p><p>This is ghastly on a moral level, but it&#8217;s also a failure on its own terms.</p><p>The war in Iran has not made America better off &#8212; in fact, it&#8217;s done so much damage that Americans revolted against it in the midterms. The Canadian tariffs have delivered neither prosperity nor a 51st state; instead, they&#8217;ve <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/16/world/canada/carney-china-xi-trump-putin-trade.html">driven America&#8217;s most important hemispheric ally into Chinese hands</a>. Boat strikes haven&#8217;t ended drug overdoses, cruel deportations haven&#8217;t produced jobs, and abandoning Ukraine hasn&#8217;t delivered cheap energy. Even regime change in Venezuela, the most &#8220;successful&#8221; of Trump&#8217;s brute force initiatives, has yielded few discernible benefits for ordinary American citizens.</p><p>Last year, the political theorist Michael Ignatieff described Trump&#8217;s international outlook as &#8220;<a href="https://michaelignatieff518703.substack.com/p/the-strong-do-what-they-can">the realism of fools</a>.&#8221; By that, he means that Trump believes that strength can be measured entirely by hard metrics like the size of a country&#8217;s army and economy &#8212; that these are the ultimate factors that determine the power of one country over another.</p><p>This foolish realism, per Ignatieff, is the reason why Trump has taken Putin&#8217;s side in Ukraine even as Kyiv has demonstrated its resilience on the battlefield. Trump believes Russia&#8217;s size and might destines it to victory, in spite of all available evidence, because he cannot grasp the &#8220;will to resist&#8221; that motivates Ukraine to out-innovate and out-strategize the conventionally superior Russian army.</p><p>&#8220;Who is strong and who is weak&#8230;do not depend solely on weapons counts, on rows of tanks, on population size. They depend on will, bloody determination, fierce desire for freedom, and the capacity to draw support because of the moral power of their case. Trump understands none of this,&#8221; he writes.</p><p>Indeed, the realism of fools infects more than just Trump&#8217;s assessment of Ukraine: it has convinced him that American strength can simply compel anyone to bend the knee, when it manifestly has not.</p><h3>Pompey&#8217;s mistake, at home and abroad</h3><p>In wielding American power like a hammer, Trump has managed to break quite a bit about the world &#8212; the international oil market, the international trade regime, America&#8217;s relationship with its allies &#8212; but delivered few of the ultimate benefits he&#8217;s promised.</p><p>There&#8217;s an almost exact parallel when it comes to domestic policy.</p><p>Trump has used executive power against the rest of the US political structure in much the same way he&#8217;s wielded military and economic power against the global political order: as a blunt force weapon designed to smash decades, if not centuries, of established rules and precedents. And once again, his administration has produced little lasting change even on its own terms.</p><p>DOGE, tasked with making the government more efficient, actually crippled core functions through mass firings <em>without</em> <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/doge-produced-largest-peacetime-workforce-cut-record-spending-kept-rising-0">actually reducing the deficit</a>. Trump&#8217;s many efforts to rig the midterm elections <a href="https://www.public-reason.com/p/trumps-authoritarianism-caused-the">collapsed under a blue tsunami</a>. Even his immigration policies were enacted almost entirely through executive action and can easily be reversed the second a Democrat retakes the White House.</p><p>There&#8217;s a basic confusion at work in both places: a sense that because you have the power to do something, you also have the power to ensure that thing ends up the way you want it to. But that&#8217;s not how power works: while you can decide what you choose to do, others decide how to react to it. And oftentimes, those others are capable of making sure your efforts don&#8217;t work out as planned &#8212; especially when you&#8217;ve royally pissed them off.</p><p>Moreover, the Trump administration forgets that rules and norms can protect just as much as they bind.</p><p>The United States benefitted from having allies who implicitly trusted it to respect their sovereignty; by breaking this bargain, asserting the superiority of the sword to the law, America now faces a world far less amenable to its will than the one that existed prior to Trump. Similarly, by wielding state power to attempt to crush the Democratic party as an organization, Trump has invited no-holds-barred political retaliation &#8212; perhaps, in the future, using some of the tools of executive power that his own administration has developed.</p><p>This weekend, Rubio and Hegseth imagined themselves Pompey in Messana. In actuality, they&#8217;re more likely Pompey in Egypt.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>I don&#8217;t use the Trump administration&#8217;s preferred &#8220;Secretary of War&#8221; because actually changing the name of the Department of Defense <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2026-01/61942-DoD-Name-Change.pdf">would require an act of Congress</a>, which the Trump administration has not been able to secure. It&#8217;s worth being a stickler about these things.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p> One gleefully noted by <a href="https://x.com/araghchi/status/2122055778374729812">the Iranian foreign minister on X</a>.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Public Reason’s launch video — plus a one-week update]]></title><description><![CDATA[Talking liberalism with Matt Yglesias, and updating you on what&#8217;s next after Public Reason&#8217;s launch.]]></description><link>https://www.public-reason.com/p/public-reasons-launch-video-plus</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.public-reason.com/p/public-reasons-launch-video-plus</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Zack Beauchamp]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 16:38:39 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/224204516/c8bab8650accce06482f7c364f8e817c.mp3" length="0" type="audio/mpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Dear readers,</p><p>Today marks the end of <a href="https://www.public-reason.com/p/introducing-public-reason">Public Reason&#8217;s first full week of life</a>, and I&#8217;m thrilled with how things are going so far. </p><p>When I left Vox to create Public Reason, my biggest concern was that my idea was a little too weird. A self-consciously liberal publication dedicated to covering the news through the lens of ideas and ideologies? What does that even look like, and who would want to read it?</p><p>Turns out, there were a lot of you! Public Reason has spent the <em>entire week</em> since Monday&#8217;s launch on the Substack Rising leaderboard, peaking at #16 in the US Politics category. All of our posts &#8212;&nbsp;on <a href="https://www.public-reason.com/p/trumps-authoritarianism-caused-the">the midterms and authoritarianism</a>, the <a href="https://www.public-reason.com/p/the-trump-dodge">GOP grappling with defeat</a>, and <a href="https://www.public-reason.com/p/why-liberalism-feels-so-boring">the failures of liberal intellectual culture</a> &#8212; have generated significant interest and engagement, both from readers and other Substackers.</p><p>To celebrate, I wanted to share a recording of our launch livestream &#8212; a conversation between myself and <span class="mention-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;name&quot;:&quot;Matthew Yglesias&quot;,&quot;id&quot;:580004,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;user&quot;,&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://substack.com/@matthewyglesias&quot;,&quot;photo_url&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/20964455-401a-494d-a8ef-9835b34e9809_3024x3024.png&quot;,&quot;uuid&quot;:&quot;4b407d2f-687a-477a-9170-f6f0483a84b3&quot;}" data-component-name="MentionToDOM"></span>. We started out talking about Public Reason and its mission, but moved on to a pretty searching conversation about how much intellectuals really matter for politics and the prospects for a more liberal future. I really enjoyed it, and I think you will too.</p><p>Two important programming notes before I go.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>The first is a question for you all: do you want more videos like this one?</p><p>On top of the live with Matt, I did launch week events with <span class="mention-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;name&quot;:&quot;Don Moynihan&quot;,&quot;id&quot;:48029198,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;user&quot;,&quot;url&quot;:null,&quot;photo_url&quot;:&quot;https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!vXBg!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fbde52992-8153-4ae9-911f-28bb76f53843_404x342.png&quot;,&quot;uuid&quot;:&quot;d8dcaeec-3618-4fad-9d56-d26cff44f730&quot;}" data-component-name="MentionToDOM"></span>, <span class="mention-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;name&quot;:&quot;Jerusalem Demsas&quot;,&quot;id&quot;:18091829,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;user&quot;,&quot;url&quot;:null,&quot;photo_url&quot;:&quot;https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!mUCJ!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1a7f11f8-2de9-48db-950e-16e2617f4de3_1168x1168.jpeg&quot;,&quot;uuid&quot;:&quot;7806575a-7833-4d52-ae3a-c26710ee1970&quot;}" data-component-name="MentionToDOM"></span>, <span class="mention-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;name&quot;:&quot;Asawin Suebsaeng&quot;,&quot;id&quot;:397563474,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;user&quot;,&quot;url&quot;:null,&quot;photo_url&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/c9ff136f-9deb-4b0b-983e-a31e4f0ad479_1564x1564.jpeg&quot;,&quot;uuid&quot;:&quot;dfefa2f7-dc9c-4467-88ef-5f59808f3e88&quot;}" data-component-name="MentionToDOM"></span>, and <span class="mention-wrap" data-attrs="{&quot;name&quot;:&quot;Charlie Sykes&quot;,&quot;id&quot;:4298516,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;user&quot;,&quot;url&quot;:null,&quot;photo_url&quot;:&quot;https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LDwO!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F38de7d26-8212-4bf7-b31c-27377ec2b080_400x400.jpeg&quot;,&quot;uuid&quot;:&quot;66e04fe4-15ef-4255-93f1-048178b8b501&quot;}" data-component-name="MentionToDOM"></span> &#8212; all of which covered different aspects of what I&#8217;m trying to do with Public Reason. If you want posts with recordings of those, let me know in the comments, and I&#8217;ll send out more &#8212; possibly with some commentary on the conversation. If you <em>really</em> like them, I might try making Public Reason Live a regular feature.</p><p>Second, I want to give a brief update on paid subscriptions.</p><p>The first month of Public Reason (at least) will be completely free to everyone. Even after the paywall goes up, about half of our content will remain free &#8212; so there&#8217;s no pressure to upgrade to paid if you&#8217;re not sure.</p><p>However, if you are enjoying what I&#8217;ve been putting out so far, I&#8217;d love for you to consider upgrading early. Public Reason is very close to reaching Substack bestseller status just from our initial crop of paid subscribers, which would be a major milestone for a publication this young &#8212; especially one without a paywall. So think about it!</p><p>Regardless, thanks to all you for making week one such a success. I&#8217;ve got a great slate of posts planned for the coming weeks, and I&#8217;m really excited to reasoning publicly together.</p><div class="install-substack-app-embed install-substack-app-embed-web" data-component-name="InstallSubstackAppToDOM"><img class="install-substack-app-embed-img" src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!SAVD!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F0b74c2f8-a896-4b2f-a958-00cf2cfecd9a_1280x1280.png"><div class="install-substack-app-embed-text"><div class="install-substack-app-header">Get more from Zack Beauchamp in the Substack app</div><div class="install-substack-app-text">Available for iOS and Android</div></div><a href="https://substack.com/app/app-store-redirect?utm_campaign=app-marketing&amp;utm_content=author-post-insert&amp;utm_source=zackbeauchamp" target="_blank" class="install-substack-app-embed-link"><button class="install-substack-app-embed-btn button primary">Get the app</button></a></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[How liberalism got so boring]]></title><description><![CDATA[Liberal intellectuals have failed at their most important task. We can change that.]]></description><link>https://www.public-reason.com/p/why-liberalism-feels-so-boring</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.public-reason.com/p/why-liberalism-feels-so-boring</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Zack Beauchamp]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 11:55:28 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/129111a7-cd58-4b4f-a103-75ca2c9a2261_3324x4096.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Liberal intellectuals frequently complain that the Democratic Party is failing. But lately, I&#8217;ve been wondering whether it&#8217;s the liberal writers who have been failing the Democrats.</p><p>In the midterms, Democrats more than did their job: they won in a generational blowout. That it was primarily a negative victory &#8212; won more by voters hating Trump than liking Democrats &#8212; makes no immediate difference for the task of checking Trump.</p><p>But it makes a great deal of difference for liberalism&#8217;s long-term future. Polls suggest Americans are fundamentally dissatisfied with both parties, and that <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-house-estimate-midterm-elections-2026/">part of the problem</a> on the Democratic side is that they <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cknv08980d3vo">don&#8217;t really know</a> what the party stands for. In a way, this is an opportunity: if Democrats can develop a new and exciting vision for the party&#8217;s purpose, they can reset the very terms of debate of American politics.</p><p>In theory, liberal intellectuals should be able to help with this.</p><p>While thinkers are generally quite bad at the nitty-gritty of political strategy, their remove from the immediate need to win and legislate gives them space to see the bigger picture. They can help develop new visions for politics that are useful for political leaders, who then adapt them in ways more suited to the campaign trail and realities of governance. Think about how Ronald Reagan&#8217;s <a href="https://reason.com/2025/06/05/the-fusionist-politics-of-ronald-reagan/">adaptation of fusionist conservative thinking</a> transformed American politics, or how <a href="https://www.amazon.com/dp/0521521106">a complex interplay between political theorizing and party politics</a> built the European social democratic model.</p><p>Today&#8217;s liberal intellectuals<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> are not very good at this. There is a kind of collective failure of imagination, with only limited and partial exceptions, that makes them less intellectually vital and politically useful<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> than their peers on the right.</p><p>When people complain about not knowing what Democrats stand for, part of the problem is that Democrats don&#8217;t know where to look for ideas. Their intellectual class has not provided them with energizing ideological visions to latch on to, and they are thus forced to construct their political appeals out of a patchwork of polls and policy proposals.</p><p>I think this is a serious and underappreciated problem for American liberalism. But I think it is a fixable one. Part of what I&#8217;m trying to do here at Public Reason is to be the change I want to see in the world.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><h3>On ideological thinking, and why it matters</h3><p>Broadly speaking, the work of political thinking takes place on three levels. At the lowest level of abstraction, there&#8217;s the development of policy and political strategy: what a better health care system might look like, or how to win a particular Senate seat. What people conventionally think of when they think about politics.</p><p>The highest level of abstraction, by contrast, is philosophical discussion of first principles and values &#8212; questions like the meaning of freedom and what makes political authority legitimate. This kind of discussion can guide or inspire political movements, but it offers little in the way of practical guidance.</p><p>Liberals excel at these lowest and highest levels of political discussion. There&#8217;s a reason why the best policy wonks and political philosophers working today tend to be somewhere on the liberal spectrum.</p><p>But there&#8217;s a level of thinking in between the two that liberals have come to neglect. It is the task of developing a worldview: a vision of political life that <em>connects</em> the highest and lowest levels of abstraction. Such a vision &#8212; properly termed an ideology &#8212; tells people who share a certain set of values how they should generally orient themselves toward real-world questions.</p><p>&#8220;Ideologies exist at the juncture of theory and practice, with one foot in the realm of abstract ideas and the other in everyday political reality,&#8221; the political scientist Sheri Berman writes in <em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/dp/0521521106">The Primacy of Politics</a></em>, an account of social democracy&#8217;s rise. &#8220;They have their greatest impact when they can seamlessly relate the one to the other, offering adherents both a satisfying explanation of the world and a guide to mastering it.&#8221;</p><p>Ideology, in this sense, is where the right excels.</p><p>Think about Reaganite fusionism<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a>: a movement made of commitments to free market economics, culturally conservative social policy, and militant anti-Communism abroad. These are not truly philosophical principles &#8212; they&#8217;re too applied for that. But they&#8217;re also too abstract to be policy doctrines. A general commitment to free market principles doesn&#8217;t tell you, say, how to structure monetary policy or childcare subsidies.</p><p>Instead, fusionism told a story about political life &#8212; one that gave people with right-of-center values a general guide they could use to think through practical politics. Fusionism says that if you are a person broadly committed to freedom and social stability, then you should be broadly skeptical of policies that regulate corporate behavior or alter social institutions like marriage.</p><p>It is that &#8220;if-then&#8221; structure &#8212; if you hold X value, then you should adopt Y orientation toward policy &#8212; that makes up the essence of ideological thinking.</p><p>If you are at all familiar with conservative thought, you&#8217;ll recognize that an enormous amount of its debates and discussions take place on this level. Marxists, too, have a robust tradition of ideological debate &#8212; pretty much every edition of <em>Jacobin</em> will have an article trying to articulate what socialist principles imply for a particular policy issue.</p><p>In the past, the ideological focus of these traditions has been a source of weakness. Ideology has a tendency to produce rigid thought, to make its adherents try to fit square pegs into round holes. Fusionist ideology produced the absurd idea that tax cuts lower the deficit; Marxist ideology produced apologias for the Soviet Union well after Stalin&#8217;s crimes were exposed.</p><p>But once Trump emerged on the scene, and shattered the old political consensus, ideological thinking became essential.</p><p>In her book, Berman argues that ideologies rise and fall through a &#8220;two-stage process.&#8221; First, &#8220;existing ideologies are questioned and tarnished, opening up a political space that competitors aspire to fill.&#8221; Second, &#8220;political actors start to develop and embrace alternative approaches&#8230;with contenders competing for mindshare and political power.&#8221;</p><p>America entered this two-stage process after the 2016 election. After the shock of <em>The Celebrity Apprentice</em>&#8217;s demagogic host winning the presidency, there was an enormous demand for explanation: not abstract theorizing or policy wonkery, but a holistic accounting of how the old ideological consensus broke and what a new order might look like.</p><p>Both the illiberal right and the socialist left were well-equipped to succeed after America entered Berman&#8217;s second stage.</p><p>Doctrines like postliberalism burst onto the scene to put ideological meat on MAGA&#8217;s personalist bones, providing material for leaders like JD Vance, Marco Rubio, and Josh Hawley looking to shape the GOP&#8217;s future. While Trump may not be a truly ideological actor, many of his top staff are &#8212; with people like Stephen Miller, Russ Vought, and Elon Musk all taking advantage of his victories to implement ideas drawn from the right&#8217;s new ideological ferment.</p><p>Similarly, socialist critics of liberalism offered a distinctive, emotionally compelling explanation for the old system&#8217;s failure &#8212; one that appealed especially to squeezed urbanites under 40. This, in part, explains the rise of the DSA as a major player in American politics.</p><p>But where were liberals? What were their bold new ideas?</p><h3>Liberals are bad at ideology &#8212; even when they try</h3><p>When you think about liberal ideological responses to the Trump era, there are probably two candidates<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> for a genuinely new and exciting ideological approaches: the loose bundle of ideas called &#8220;wokeness,&#8221; and the abundance movement. Neither fully fits the bill.</p><p>Wokeness was, at heart, a bottom-up liberal appropriation of ideas and practices taken from radical left activism and academia. I think it ended up working well in some ways &#8212; it <a href="https://www.vox.com/23811277/christopher-rufo-culture-wars-ron-desantis-florida-critical-race-theory-anti-wokeness">channeled</a> what could have been destabilizing radical tendencies <a href="https://www.vox.com/2020/2/20/20954059/liberalism-identity-politics-defense">toward more productive ends</a> &#8212; but also came with some well-known downsides that, ultimately, exhausted most everyone involved. We&#8217;re talking about &#8220;Woke 1&#8221; in the past tense for a reason.</p><p>Moreover, it&#8217;s not obvious that wokeness was ever a true ideology; it was notoriously difficult to pin down or define. No one really called themselves &#8220;woke&#8221; or attempted to codify a set of woke principles they themselves stood by; the term has mostly become an epithet used by critics of liberal social justice thinking and practices. In the end, &#8220;wokeness&#8221; was never really a coherent enough set of ideas to function as a true ideology systematically connecting values to practice.</p><p>Abundance, by contrast, is definitely a liberal ideological project. It&#8217;s also a pretty successful one, providing the Democratic Party with a useful new source of policy inspiration on issues like energy and affordability. It even helps us see what a better way to do liberal ideology could look like (I&#8217;ll return to this at the end).</p><p>However, abundance was not created to rebuild liberalism as such; abundance&#8217;s worldview is primarily about economic policy, and really a subset<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a> of it. The abundance movement isn&#8217;t <em>trying</em> to redefine liberalism in the holistic way that, say, postliberals are trying to redefine conservatism for the Trump era. Abundance is more like a component piece of a new liberal ideology than a full one in itself.</p><p>The most systematic attempts to do liberal ideology of late have come not from either of these camps, but rather from an older guard of liberal intellectuals &#8212; who have been less interested in building a new liberal ideology than vindicating a version of the existing one.</p><p>These writers have put out a series of &#8220;in defense of liberalism&#8221; manifestos since Trump that tend to follow a very familiar pattern. They define foundational liberal philosophical principles, make the case for their attractiveness, and defend them against perceived attacks on the right and left. They often point to some specific liberal policy or intellectual mistakes, and then conclude with some hasty musings about what liberals might do to bring themselves back from the abyss.</p><p>When I read this stuff, I tend to find myself nodding along with most of their arguments. Hell, <a href="https://www.vox.com/politics/418116/anti-liberal-moment-end-trump-ahmari-moyn">I&#8217;ve written them</a>. But the genre is limited by its intrinsic defensiveness, its focus on liberalism&#8217;s critics and failings rather than a path forward.</p><p>Perhaps most importantly, such work is almost never ideological in the sense that I&#8217;ve defined it &#8212; generally operating primarily, if not exclusively, on the philosophical or practical-political level. While a postliberal book like <em>Why Liberalism Fails</em> seamlessly blends the levels<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-6" href="#footnote-6" target="_self">6</a> to produce a distinctive new ideological viewpoint, the defenses of liberalism generally fall into familiar and politically unproductive patterns.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>I want to use two recent books to illustrate the point. Both are high-profile attempts to revitalize liberalism, written by celebrated liberal intellectuals at the top of their respective fields. They should, in theory, be the best the &#8220;in defense of liberalism&#8221; genre has to offer.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-7" href="#footnote-7" target="_self">7</a></p><p>The first is Daron Acemoglu&#8217;s <em><a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/815318/what-happened-to-liberal-democracy-by-daron-acemoglu/">What Happened to Liberal Democracy?</a></em>. Acemoglu is by all accounts brilliant &#8212; an MIT economist who won the Nobel Prize for <a href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2024/press-release/">his work on political institutions and economic growth</a>. His theory, that liberalism can be revived by a renewed focus on helping the working class, is considerably more forward-looking than most &#8220;in defense of liberalism&#8221; essays.</p><p>Yet the book itself is largely stuck on the lowest level of abstraction. Acemoglu conceptualizes liberalism&#8217;s current crisis as stemming primarily from its failure to deliver materially,<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-8" href="#footnote-8" target="_self">8</a> and his proposed solutions are largely couched in policy terms. He proposes ideas like reserving &#8220;a fraction of candidacies and leadership positions in center-left parties for individuals without a college degree&#8221; and integrating AI into government service provision.</p><p>While Acemoglu is comfortable thinking in policy details, he&#8217;s basically uninterested in consideration of values. As the philosopher <a href="https://settingoutforithaka.substack.com/p/acemoglus-working-class-liberalism">John Tasioulas observes</a>, Acemoglu is strikingly resistant to any serious discussion of liberal moral principles &#8212; grounding his defense of liberalism almost entirely in the argument that it works in a practical sense (e.g., providing people the goods they need).</p><p>&#8220;This situation would not be so troubling if Acemoglu admitted that his theory of liberalism required philosophical supplementation in a broader intellectual division of labour, that it is not a &#8216;full justification of liberalism.&#8217; Instead, he seemingly doubles down on denying the need for any such supplementation,&#8221; Tasioulas writes.</p><p>This may sound like exactly what a philosopher would say about an economist, but it&#8217;s actually a profound point. What philosophy does, that economics can&#8217;t, is help people think about questions of ultimate value and meaning: to give people a sense of what their political commitments <em>should</em> be about. Any ideology worth its salt has some answer to that question; Acemoglu&#8217;s economistic liberalism cannot provide one.</p><p>On the opposite end of the spectrum, you have <a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262049771/on-liberalism/">Cass Sunstein&#8217;s </a><em><a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262049771/on-liberalism/">On Liberalism</a></em>.</p><p>Sunstein, like Acemoglu, is widely acknowledged to be brilliant: a Harvard Law professor with extensive real-world policy experience working for both Barack Obama and Joe Biden. His book <em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/dp/014311526X?lv=shuf&amp;channelId=500&amp;plpRedirect=mhFallback">Nudge</a></em> (with Richard Thaler) developed an entirely new way of thinking about public policy.</p><p>Yet <em>On Liberalism</em> is curiously abstract. It is almost entirely devoted to liberal philosophy &#8212; offering an account and defense of core liberal ideals like freedom of speech and the rule of law. His ultimate aim is to show that liberalism is not only an attractive political philosophy, but a capacious one &#8212; one that can encompass everyone from Hayek and Reagan on the right to Rawls and Obama on the left.</p><p>References to politicians aside, the practical work of politics is not his concern. Sunstein has no interest in developing an applied liberal vision, one that shows how to turn the liberal principles he defends into a real-world political doctrine. In an interview with <em>The New Yorker</em>&#8217;s Isaac Chotiner, Sunstein explains why in strikingly honest terms.</p><p>&#8220;Talking about the President makes me grumpy and talking about John Stuart Mill or John Rawls makes me the opposite of grumpy,&#8221; <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/can-liberalism-be-saved">he says</a>.</p><p>Hence why Sunstein&#8217;s book, for all its author&#8217;s intellectual firepower, failed to provide a blueprint for liberal revitalization. It was intended to operate exclusively on the highest level of abstraction.</p><h3>Why liberalism is so bad at ideology &#8212; and how to fix it</h3><p>I first started to think seriously about liberalism&#8217;s ideology problem a little over a year ago, when two young liberals asked me how to get started as a liberal in the ideas industry. I realized I didn&#8217;t have a good answer, and started wondering why. What I realized &#8212; <a href="https://www.vox.com/on-the-right-newsletter/458520/liberalism-pipeline-problem">summarized in this Vox piece</a> &#8212; is that liberals don&#8217;t think about training their youth in the same way conservatives do.</p><p>Liberals tend to get their training in low-paying jobs at facially neutral institutions: hyper-specialized PhD programs in the humanities or social sciences, internships at mainstream newspapers, or entry-level policy think tank fellowships. These are not intended to do ideological education, but rather to train one to do a specific profession &#8212; professor, lawyer, journalist, policy analyst, etc.</p><p>By contrast, conservatism has a culture of explicitly ideological education. Donors have invested heavily in programs that are designed to encourage ideological thinking, <a href="https://www.vox.com/on-the-right-newsletter/458520/liberalism-pipeline-problem">training their young writers</a> at retreats and fellowships where they study Burke, Hayek, and (more recently) Carl Schmitt. Young conservatives are simultaneously learning conservative thought, being trained to present that thought in a public-facing way, and being introduced to people who will give them a job doing just that.</p><p>Conservatives built this culture, in part, because they felt locked out of mainstream institutions. Indeed, liberals do benefit from being the majority on the Harvard faculty and New York Times masthead.</p><p>But by professionalizing their intellectual training, liberals have accidentally bifurcated it. Liberal philosophers and policy wonks are rarely collaborators, seeing themselves engaged in fundamentally different enterprises: one abstract and academic, the other applied and relevant. The culture of professionalism that suffuses the left precludes the boundary-breaking thinking inherent to the enterprise of ideological work, making the very principles of liberalism feel staid and boring in a world or rapid change.</p><p>The fact that conservatives are trained and socialized in a culture designed to produce ideologues rather than professionals often leads to lower-quality intellectual work. But it also makes conservatives natural ideological thinkers, and the movement they lead more equipped to fill ideological vacuums with exciting new ideas. The same is true, in a more complicated way, for socialists.</p><p>This would suggest a natural solution: rich liberal donors should fund people who want to create equivalents to the right&#8217;s training fora. That&#8217;s a great idea, and they should do it. But it&#8217;s not exactly a practicable short-term solution.</p><p>Immediately, liberals need to try to consciously unlearn their professionalized impulses. We should, in our writing and podcasting and video production, intentionally try to do work that connects the levels of philosophy and practical politics, taking ideas from both realms seriously. We should study the conservatives and socialists who are doing it successfully, and adapt some of their habits of mind.</p><p>To my mind, the exemplar here is Alexandre Lefebvre &#8212; a Canadian philosopher at the University of Sydney, who is currently working on <a href="https://x.com/alex_usyd/status/2119738008098549821">a book attempting to do just this</a>. His prior book, <em><a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691203744/liberalism-as-a-way-of-life?srsltid=AYCX9vIcdihhFBU4cKE7iBi2YIo648MnwA0Ew6BzcYQeJehPftBN0-sv">Liberalism as a Way of Life</a></em>, is a case study in how to do liberal ideology <em>without</em> falling into the &#8220;in defense of liberalism&#8221; trap.</p><p>The book&#8217;s central argument is that liberalism is not merely a political theory, but rather the source of many of the values that we hold dear in everyday life. Many of the qualities we see as virtues &#8212; for instance, treating people fairly regardless of background &#8212; are basically derived from the liberal morality that makes up &#8220;the water in which we swim.&#8221; Our current societies, which fall short of lofty liberal standards, can be improved by forcing them to confront the gap between their principles and reality.</p><p>In this, Lefebvre actually agrees with postliberals (like Harvard&#8217;s Adrian Vermeule) who argue that liberalism&#8217;s claim to value neutrality is something of a sham. But unlike those critics, Lefebvre thinks the liberal moral system is a <em>good</em> one: not just for societies, but for each of us as people. He looks at the &#8220;<a href="https://hypertext.niskanencenter.org/p/meaning-and-the-crisis-of-liberalism">crisis of meaning</a>&#8221; in the world around us and says renewed purpose can be found in trying to be true to liberal values &#8212; in trying to fix the ways our lives and societies fall short of liberal ideas.</p><p>&#8220;We&#8217;ve never given up on the core of religion: to seek meaning in life through something beyond us. Our beyond is found not on another plane of existence but instead in something worldly just beyond our grasp &#8212; an ideal of becoming a free and generous person in a fair and just society,&#8221; he writes.</p><p>It may not seem like it, but Lefebvre&#8217;s argument does exactly the kind of ideological work I&#8217;m calling for. He provides an illuminating discussion of what liberal values are, and then connects them to what is at heart a political problem: the collective sense of purposelessness, of aimlessness, of powerlessness that seems to suffuse modern life. He even outlines some &#8220;spiritual exercises,&#8221; drawn from liberal political philosophy, that people can use to fix their lives.</p><p>Lefebvre&#8217;s book is very different from <em>Abundance</em>, but both work better than the &#8220;in defense of liberalism&#8221; essay for the same reason: they follow the classic writing advice of show, don&#8217;t tell.</p><p>The &#8220;in defense of liberalism&#8221; genre spends a lot of time talking <em>about</em> liberalism, but vanishingly little time showing how to actually be a liberal in the world. By contrast, both <em>Liberalism as a Way of Life</em> and <em>Abundance</em> are interested in real-world liberal hypocrisy &#8212; when it comes to morality and economic policy, respectively &#8212; and in showing that they are not inherent contradictions, but rather defects that can be improved by a more thoughtful application of liberal values. They do not preach liberalism, but demonstrate what it means.</p><p>This is the way forward for liberal intellectuals: to take the philosophical and policy-level work liberals have done and turn it into specific, concrete liberal visions for a particular element of political life. Ultimately, these disparate efforts should be able to be stitched together into something truly comprehensive &#8212; a genuinely exciting reformulation of liberalism for modern times.</p><p>If liberal intellectuals choose instead to fall back on our old familiar habits, then we should be prepared to complain a lot less about the Democratic Party&#8217;s lack of vision. It would, to at least some degree, be our fault.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Public Reason is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p> Normally, I draw a pretty sharp distinction between the two senses of liberalism: the American sense of &#8220;broadly center-left&#8221; and the philosophical sense of committed to a vision of politics based on liberty and consent of the governed. In this case, I&#8217;m comfortable running them together, because American liberals in both senses have become overwhelmingly concentrated in the Democratic Party &#8212; which isn&#8217;t an ideal state of affairs, but that&#8217;s a separate post.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Note that I did not say &#8220;substantively correct.&#8221; LIberalism&#8217;s problem is not correctness in a narrow sense, but imagination and verve.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Fusionism was, I think, part of the liberal family in philosophical terms &#8212; just with a very different intellectual culture than left-of-center liberalism. This cultural divide has persisted as American conservatism has become philosophically antiliberal, and the left-of-center faction has come to include pretty much all of America&#8217;s philosophical liberals.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>One might think of others that resemble ideologies &#8212; like Bidenomics or popularism &#8212; but quite clearly are not the genuine article.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p> Abundance famously does not have a clear stance on distributional questions, for example.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-6" href="#footnote-anchor-6" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">6</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>This is not to endorse the book&#8217;s specific method of argument, which I think fails precisely because it is <em>too </em>willing to blend empirical and normative claims &#8212; sloppily assigning blame to liberalism for various real-world ills without sufficient empirical evidence. It&#8217;s possible to have too much of a good thing.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-7" href="#footnote-anchor-7" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">7</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Believe me, I made this hard for myself &#8212; there are plenty of worse books I could have chosen as to pick on here.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-8" href="#footnote-anchor-8" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">8</a><div class="footnote-content"><p> I think this is <a href="https://www.vox.com/2023/8/4/23818817/trump-support-david-brooks-economic-anxiety">almost certainly wrong</a>.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Trump dodge]]></title><description><![CDATA[The revealing line MAGA believers are using to explain away the midterms.]]></description><link>https://www.public-reason.com/p/the-trump-dodge</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.public-reason.com/p/the-trump-dodge</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Zack Beauchamp]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 12:05:43 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LInz!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45bcaf92-764c-4c87-95de-23450a1e0d79_2048x1366.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LInz!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45bcaf92-764c-4c87-95de-23450a1e0d79_2048x1366.jpeg" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LInz!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45bcaf92-764c-4c87-95de-23450a1e0d79_2048x1366.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LInz!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45bcaf92-764c-4c87-95de-23450a1e0d79_2048x1366.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LInz!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45bcaf92-764c-4c87-95de-23450a1e0d79_2048x1366.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LInz!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45bcaf92-764c-4c87-95de-23450a1e0d79_2048x1366.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LInz!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45bcaf92-764c-4c87-95de-23450a1e0d79_2048x1366.jpeg" width="1456" height="971" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/45bcaf92-764c-4c87-95de-23450a1e0d79_2048x1366.jpeg&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:971,&quot;width&quot;:1456,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:434477,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:&quot;image/jpeg&quot;,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:false,&quot;topImage&quot;:true,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:&quot;https://www.public-reason.com/i/224247513?img=https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45bcaf92-764c-4c87-95de-23450a1e0d79_2048x1366.jpeg&quot;,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LInz!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45bcaf92-764c-4c87-95de-23450a1e0d79_2048x1366.jpeg 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LInz!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45bcaf92-764c-4c87-95de-23450a1e0d79_2048x1366.jpeg 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LInz!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45bcaf92-764c-4c87-95de-23450a1e0d79_2048x1366.jpeg 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!LInz!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F45bcaf92-764c-4c87-95de-23450a1e0d79_2048x1366.jpeg 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">Credit: <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/gageskidmore/54362405574/in/photostream/">Gage Skidmore</a></figcaption></figure></div><p>Back in 2005, there was a raging argument over why the Iraq war had turned into such a disaster. Some argued (correctly) that the war was always a doomed endeavor; others, especially liberals who supported the initial invasion,<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> argued that it could have gone well had the Bush administration been more competent.</p><p>The writers Sam Rosenfeld and Matt Yglesias termed that last argument &#8220;<a href="https://prospect.org/2005/10/23/incompetence-dodge-d2/">the incompetence dodge</a>.&#8221; It was, in their view, a kind of self-deception: &#8220;a way for liberal hawks to acknowledge the obviously grim reality of the war without rethinking any of the premises that led them to support it in the first place.&#8221;</p><p>After the midterm debacle, a similar kind of dodge is emerging on the MAGA right. It is the argument that the midterm defeat can be blamed not on the ideas behind the Trump movement, but on the administration&#8217;s failure to properly implement and adhere to its principles.</p><p>Call it the Trump dodge.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Public Reason is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p>You saw a version of this immediately after the results, when JD Vance blamed the midterm result almost <a href="https://x.com/JDVance/status/2118004988433641835">entirely on Trump voters feeling betrayed by the Iran war</a>. The Daily Wire&#8217;s Matt Walsh gave a &#8220;<a href="https://x.com/MattWalshBlog/status/2117813323643191704">very simple</a>&#8221; explanation for the result: &#8220;Trump abandoned the American [sic] First message. This is why Republicans are getting crushed.&#8221; Writing in the New York Times, conservative intellectual Christopher Caldwell <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/04/opinion/trump-midterms-republicans.html">argued that</a> &#8220;through a mix of vanity, instability and foolishness,&#8221; Trump &#8220;snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.&#8221; There are <a href="https://amgreatness.com/2026/11/06/tough-love-for-president-trump-reclaiming-america-first-after-the-midterms/">many other pieces</a> in this vein.</p><p>As with Iraq, these arguments are not entirely wrong &#8212; it is true that both the war in Iraq and the second Trump presidency were plagued by incompetent execution. </p><p>But also as with Iraq, the Trump dodge is essentially an evasion. It provides (ahem) a way for populist conservatives to acknowledge the obviously grim reality of the Trump presidency without rethinking any of the premises that led them to support it in the first place.</p><p>The rising popularity of the Trump dodge is not just a reflection of the MAGA right&#8217;s unwillingness to engage in self-reflection. Rather, it points to a more profound truth: that conservative intellectuals are trying to rescue an idea &#8212; America First, or Trumpism &#8212; that never really existed.</p><h3>Anatomy of a dodge</h3><p>The Trump dodge arguments are defined by a sense of loss or betrayal. The dodgers believe that Trump won with a mandate to enact a particular ideological agenda, called MAGA or America First &#8212; economic nationalism, hardline culture war, tough immigration enforcement, and a more isolationist foreign policy. But he betrayed that agenda through both incompetence and ideological treason on Iran, and it is that betrayal that produced an electoral catastrophe.</p><p>Caldwell&#8217;s piece is the clearest and most coherent articulation of this view I&#8217;ve encountered so far. He begins by asking us to &#8220;think back to 12 months ago, when President Trump appeared well positioned to deliver on an ambitious and still-popular agenda.&#8221; Back then, Caldwell writes, &#8220;there were still a few polls showing his approval rating near 50 percent.&#8221;</p><p>Caldwell&#8217;s citation of a &#8220;few polls&#8221; is so misleading I have to assume it&#8217;s deliberate. Individual polls might say anything, which is why responsible pundits cite averages whenever available. And indeed, poll averages <a href="https://www.natesilver.net/p/trump-approval-ratings-nate-silver-bulletin">like Nate Silver&#8217;s</a> show that Trump&#8217;s approval rating was already double-digit negative by the period Caldwell romanticizes.</p><div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y777!,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F15ae9b47-daed-400a-a5b0-0b5d18335de6_1220x1196.png" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y777!,w_424,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F15ae9b47-daed-400a-a5b0-0b5d18335de6_1220x1196.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y777!,w_848,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F15ae9b47-daed-400a-a5b0-0b5d18335de6_1220x1196.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y777!,w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F15ae9b47-daed-400a-a5b0-0b5d18335de6_1220x1196.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y777!,w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F15ae9b47-daed-400a-a5b0-0b5d18335de6_1220x1196.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw"><img src="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y777!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F15ae9b47-daed-400a-a5b0-0b5d18335de6_1220x1196.png" width="1220" height="1196" data-attrs="{&quot;src&quot;:&quot;https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/15ae9b47-daed-400a-a5b0-0b5d18335de6_1220x1196.png&quot;,&quot;srcNoWatermark&quot;:null,&quot;fullscreen&quot;:null,&quot;imageSize&quot;:null,&quot;height&quot;:1196,&quot;width&quot;:1220,&quot;resizeWidth&quot;:null,&quot;bytes&quot;:null,&quot;alt&quot;:null,&quot;title&quot;:null,&quot;type&quot;:null,&quot;href&quot;:null,&quot;belowTheFold&quot;:true,&quot;topImage&quot;:false,&quot;internalRedirect&quot;:null,&quot;isProcessing&quot;:false,&quot;align&quot;:null,&quot;offset&quot;:false}" class="sizing-normal" alt="" srcset="https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y777!,w_424,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F15ae9b47-daed-400a-a5b0-0b5d18335de6_1220x1196.png 424w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y777!,w_848,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F15ae9b47-daed-400a-a5b0-0b5d18335de6_1220x1196.png 848w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y777!,w_1272,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F15ae9b47-daed-400a-a5b0-0b5d18335de6_1220x1196.png 1272w, https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/$s_!y777!,w_1456,c_limit,f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F15ae9b47-daed-400a-a5b0-0b5d18335de6_1220x1196.png 1456w" sizes="auto, 100vw" loading="lazy"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a></figure></div><p>If you look at the chart, you can see that Caldwell&#8217;s narrative begins far too late  &#8212; that the public began souring on Trump far earlier than he lets on, back when he was allegedly faithful to the MAGA agenda. In fact, as the center-right data analyst Sean Trende <a href="https://pollvault.substack.com/p/it-was-all-the-things">points out</a>, the first big spike in Trump&#8217;s disapproval was in April 2025 &#8212; seemingly in direct reaction to the &#8220;Liberation Day&#8221; tariffs announced on April 2.</p><p>Caldwell, to be fair, does acknowledge that the tariffs weren&#8217;t exactly well-received. But he insists that this early period was nonetheless one in which Trump&#8217;s agenda was still broadly popular.</p><blockquote><p>Yes, Mr. Trump had alienated domestic adversaries and foreign allies alike. He had frightened investors with his manic tariff announcements. But he had come within a hair of winning an outright majority in the popular vote in 2024. Almost a year into his second term, his administration was, if not beloved, at least sustainably popular.</p></blockquote><p>Caldwell insists on this point, incompatibility with the data aside, in order to create a binary between Trump&#8217;s first and second years in office &#8212; and, by extension, between true and betrayed MAGA. Describing actions ranging from the purge of the federal bureaucracy to the immigration crackdown as basically sensible, he suggests that Trump erred not in policy judgment but in execution.</p><p>Trump &#8220;could have effectively made the case for raids of the sort he ordered in Minnesota,&#8221; he argues, &#8220;but &#8220;this required explaining, and explaining is something Mr. Trump has always been poor at.&#8221; Trump was right to push for greater US control over Greenland, but erred in his &#8220;insistence on besmirching Denmark&#8221; while doing so.</p><p>These arguments are an attempt at ideological hygiene: separating the worldview of the Trump administration (good!) from the way that Trump went about implementing it in 2026 (bad!). But when it comes to Iran, his tone shifts &#8212; arguing that the policy itself is not an example of good populism done badly, but a bad idea through and through.</p><p>&#8220;That war has penetrated every crevice of the Trump administration, discrediting all of it,&#8221; he writes. &#8220;Districts and states that went for Mr. Trump by large margins in 2024 shifted away from Republicans across the country.&#8221;</p><p>This is the crux of the Trump dodge maneuver. It is to carve out a separation between &#8220;true&#8221; right-wing populism &#8212; what Matt Walsh calls &#8220;America First&#8221; &#8212; and perceived betrayals of it, which alienated the populist masses.</p><p>The overriding focus on Iran reflects the perception that it was a qualitatively different kind of betrayal.</p><p>While dodgers may admit Trump&#8217;s heavy-handed ICE raids were over-the-top, they insist that essential impulse to crack down on immigration is correct &#8212; and thus the failure is one of execution rather than any flaw in the idea of mass deportation. Iran, by contrast, was an <em>in-principle</em> mistake: a knowing abandonment of the alleged &#8220;no new wars&#8221; component of the America First worldview.</p><h3>Trumpism cannot exist without Trump</h3><p>Reading this stuff, the temptation to scream &#8220;I told you so&#8221; is overwhelming.</p><p>Caldwell, for example, moans about Donald Trump&#8217;s &#8220;vanity, instability and foolishness&#8221; destroying his administration. But Donald Trump was quite obviously a vain, unstable, and foolish person, and always had been. The people who centered Trump&#8217;s character in their Trump 2 forecasts &#8212; primarily resist libs and never Trumpers &#8212; are the ones who accurately forecast paramilitary ICE raids and unthinking violence abroad. It was the Trump sympathizers, including <a href="https://unherd.com/2025/01/donald-trumps-second-coming/?edition=us">Caldwell himself</a>, who suggested things would be otherwise.</p><p>It&#8217;s not as if these people were blind to Trump&#8217;s personality flaws: after this long, no one could be. Rather, it is that they posited that Trump was a tribune of a broader movement &#8212; America First, MAGA, Trumpism, whatever you want to call it &#8212; whose contours were conjured into existence by the speaker in question.</p><p>Iran, sold as the ultimate betrayal, is actually the clearest case in point. While it is now an article of faith among Trump dodgers that the MAGA movement was all about opposing foreign interventionism, no one seems ever to have told Trump that. His critical campaign comments about &#8220;<a href="https://theconversation.com/donald-trump-campaigned-against-endless-wars-so-why-is-he-risking-another-one-in-iran-277370">forever wars</a>&#8221; were belied by a lifetime of hawkish rhetoric and actions.</p><p>In his first term, Trump assassinated a top Iranian general, bombed Syrian government targets, and courted war with North Korea. He dramatically escalated US bombings in the war on terror, <a href="https://www.vox.com/23677654/trump-foreign-policy-revisionist-history-dove-anti-imperial">killing more civilians in Iraq and Syria alone</a> than the Gulf war, Kosovo intervention, and Libya war <em>combined.</em></p><p>Even before all that, Trump&#8217;s claim to be a dove was a con. Though he had claimed to oppose US wars in Iraq and Libya, <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2016/5/27/11608580/donald-trump-foreign-policy-war-iraq-hillary-clinton">he was (surprise!) lying</a>: he had supported both before they went badly. His record on Iran <a href="https://www.compactmag.com/article/trump-was-always-an-iran-hawk/">is particularly hawkish</a>: he first called for a US invasion of Iran<em> over 45 years ago</em>.</p><p>To ignore all of that, and posit Trump as the leader of some kind of populist anti-war movement, required a heroic act of ideological invention. From Vance on down, believers in the MAGA movement took Trump&#8217;s occasional anti-war rhetoric and ran with it &#8212; deciding, against all evidence, that being anti-war was a core principle of a movement led by Donald J. Trump.</p><p>This, I think, helps us understand what it is that the Trump dodge proponents are truly trying to dodge.</p><p>Partially, it is the familiar avoidance of political movements that crash on contact with reality. Right-wing populism cannot fail, it can only be failed.</p><p>But more fundamentally, it is an avoidance of the basic recognition that the movement they invented in their heads was a fiction. Caldwell, Walsh, even Vance: they all claim that there was a standard, out in the world, of what it meant to be America First or MAGA that was independent of Trump&#8217;s will. That Trump could be measured against a set of MAGA principles and found wanting.</p><p>This is an impossibility. &#8220;MAGA&#8221; was not an ideology, clearly laid out and agreed upon by its adherents, that united the movement. It was a collection of impulses and right-populist vagaries, united primarily by the man at the movement&#8217;s head. It was anti-immigrant, of course, but what that meant in practice <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trump-calls-h-1b-visas-necessary-bring-certain-talents-says-us-lacks-rcna243367">shifted with Trump himself</a>.</p><p>In March, when MAGA pundits were accusing him of betraying the movement over Iran, he replied that &#8220;<a href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/am-maga-trump-defends-true-151251247.html">I am MAGA.</a>&#8221;<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> And as recently as November 1, Trump&#8217;s approval rating <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/poll-voters-demand-change-check-trump-fueling-steep-democratic-midterm-rcna606183">among self-described MAGA Republicans was 93 percent</a> &#8212; hardly a figure consistent with a movement that believed itself betrayed.</p><p>Ironically, it is Trump&#8217;s departure that may be most likely to turn MAGA into an actually determinate ideological construct. If he leaves office amidst a ruined agenda, as seems likely, even many currently in that 93 percent will feel like they&#8217;re left the bag. They will be hungry to be told that they weren&#8217;t conned by an inveterate conman, but rather that the movement they believed in was betrayed and compromised. That True MAGA, whatever that is, has never been tried.</p><p>To them, someone like Vance will say he feels their pain, that the elite class is to blame, and that he is their retribution.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>For those of you who were not yet alive or sapient, liberal hawkishness was <a href="https://www.vox.com/22639548/911-anniversary-war-on-terror-liberal-interventionism">a big thing in the early 2000s</a>.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>In his recent interview with Ross Douthat, Trump did say that <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/6207498-donald-trump-maga-republicans-gop-midterm-losses/">MAGA could exist without him</a>. But in context, I take that as referring exclusively to a period after he&#8217;s out of office.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Or at least, he&#8217;ll try to. It&#8217;s very hard to imagine the Vice President in the failed administration pulling off that kind of distancing maneuver.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Introducing Public Reason]]></title><description><![CDATA[Fixing liberalism&#8217;s ideas problem, one post at a time.]]></description><link>https://www.public-reason.com/p/introducing-public-reason</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.public-reason.com/p/introducing-public-reason</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Zack Beauchamp]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 12:04:19 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://substack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com/public/images/55005726-01e3-49b7-815e-17cafd75eef3_2000x1010.jpeg" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The midterm elections &#8212; together with contests in Brazil, Serbia, and to some degree even Israel &#8212; have changed the world. All of a sudden, the once-ascendant populist right is on the back foot; a seemingly exhausted liberalism is back in the game.</p><p>Why did this happen? Is it going to continue? And what comes next?</p><p>These are the kinds of questions I covered at Vox for over a decade; I even <a href="http://amazon.com/dp/B0CMQB8S94">wrote a book about them</a>. But I&#8217;ve recently realized there&#8217;s a better way to try to answer them &#8212; and I founded Public Reason to actually do it.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><p>One thing that&#8217;s struck me over the years is how rare it is for ordinary voters anywhere to say they want to get rid of democracy.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> Despite mass discontent with the political status quo, polls show consistently high support for the basic principle of citizens choosing who rules them. Would-be authoritarians, knowing this, campaign as believers in democracy to avoid popular wrath.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a></p><p>To sell themselves as democrats, these leaders and their allies construct an oft-complicated ideological scaffolding &#8212; a set of arguments, ideas, and concepts to justify their quest for power that, in at least some cases,<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a> the would-be authoritarians genuinely believe. We cannot understand the current crisis of democracy without taking these ideas, and the intellectuals who help develop them, seriously as agents of political change.</p><p>Liberal thinkers have, on the whole, proven surprisingly bad at this. In her <a href="https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0FXHGMYY1?lv=shuf&amp;channelId=500&amp;plpRedirect=mhFallback">recent book on far-right intellectuals</a>, Laura Field observes that &#8220;if I&#8217;m right that the New Right puts Ideas First, liberals and the Democrats seem to put them last &#8212; having incubated them in an AI lab, tested them against a dozen polls, and assigned them to a celebrity to rehearse.&#8221;</p><p>Many liberals misidentified the roots of Trump&#8217;s support because they <a href="https://www.vox.com/2023/8/4/23818817/trump-support-david-brooks-economic-anxiety">refused to take the cultural worldview of his base as deeply-held belief</a>. They were <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/9/20750160/liberalism-trump-putin-socialism-reactionary">caught flat-footed</a> by the rise of an intellectually muscular postliberal right. And they have <a href="https://www.vox.com/on-the-right-newsletter/458520/liberalism-pipeline-problem">totally failed to train bright young liberals</a> to engage in intellectual combat.</p><p>This inability to appreciate the political potency of ideas is a key reason why liberals have lacked a positive vision. It&#8217;s easy to stand against anti-democratic extremists; you can win elections <a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/how-democrats-won-their-blowout-midterm-victory-2026-11-07/">largely by being their photo-negative</a>. But developing a new idea of what you&#8217;re for that fits the times is harder. It requires serious ideological effort, and liberals have let their ideological muscles decay.</p><p>Public Reason exists to write about political ideas with the depth and seriousness they deserve.  I want to show you the ideas that matter: to explain them, analyze them, and argue with them. In doing so, I hope to help you better understand the times we&#8217;re living in. And, ultimately, I aim to come up with some better ideas for thinking liberally about our world.</p><h3>What Public Reason will do</h3><p>Coverage of political ideas has a tendency to fall into one of two traps. Either it&#8217;s simplified to the point where it does violence to the ideas in question, or it&#8217;s so esoteric that it feels mostly irrelevant to the things people actually care about.</p><p>Public Reason aims to avoid both of those traps. My goal is to be relevant and rigorous in covering the site&#8217;s main interests: the state of democracy in the United States and the world more broadly, the critique of liberalism on both the left and the right, the fate of the liberal international order, and the underlying debates over fundamental political values.</p><p>Many outlets cover these topics through detailed policy analysis (say, a legal breakdown of the Trump DOJ&#8217;s attack on voting rights) or horse-race political analysis (say, whether moderate or progressive Democrats perform better at the ballot box). I&#8217;m not trying to do either of those things, at least not primarily.</p><p>Instead, Public Reason<em> </em>is built around the idea that the same readers who want a better understanding of the news of the day (like the midterms and the latest AI developments) are also interested in engaging with deeper, more fundamental political questions about ideology. To give you a sense of what Public Reason&#8217;s ideas-first approach looks like, here are some of the pieces I&#8217;ve planned for the early days:</p><ul><li><p>A <a href="https://www.public-reason.com/p/trumps-authoritarianism-caused-the">post-midterm assessment</a> of whether Trump has already turned the United States into an authoritarian state</p></li><li><p>A close look at the internal debate on the right over the causes of its 2026 defeat</p></li><li><p>An examination of the ideological influences on Elon Musk and how they&#8217;ve shaped his alignment with the GOP and Trump</p></li><li><p>A critique of materialist approaches to thinking about politics</p></li><li><p>A look at the ideology of the leading AI labs, and how they&#8217;re encoding their beliefs into products that are shaping our future</p></li><li><p>An assessment of why liberal intellectuals are having so much trouble adjusting their worldview in light of the current crisis</p></li><li><p>A deep dive into the data on the (overstated) decline of morality in American public life</p></li></ul><p>For the first month, all of Public Reason&#8217;s content will be available to everyone. After that, about half will be exclusive to paying subscribers. Paid subscribers will also be able to engage in our comment section, which I&#8217;m hoping to use as an active discussion forum with you all, and will get full access to the archives. The highest-tier subscribers &#8212; the &#8220;Most Reasonable&#8221; &#8212; will be able to join a monthly chat with me.</p><h3>Why &#8220;Public Reason&#8221;</h3><p>The name Public Reason is taken from John Rawls, the greatest political philosopher of the 20th century.</p><p>Rawls sees &#8220;public reason&#8221; as the rules and norms that should govern the way we engage with each other politically. At its strictest, public reason requires that we justify our fundamental laws by reference to values all citizens could reasonably be expected to endorse.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-4" href="#footnote-4" target="_self">4</a> You can&#8217;t just impose a constitutional structure on people based on sectarian political or theological beliefs; you need to make a colorable case for the system based on values (like equality and liberty) that citizens share.</p><p>The Rawlsian schema was designed for an idealized society, not the actual world we live in. And yet I find the ambition behind it inspirational. The notion that we owe a duty of justification to our fellow citizens, that part of what it means to live in a democracy is to engage with each other intellectually as equals, captures something important about who we should want to be.</p><p>That&#8217;s the spirit I want to bring to this site. I want to engage in rigorous argument and analysis &#8212; to make the case for my political and moral beliefs without compromise or hesitation. But I also want to do so in the fairest way possible: to see what&#8217;s reasonable about the beliefs of others, even those I deeply disagree with, and engage with them on terms that take them seriously as equal participants in a shared political project.</p><p>&#8220;The ideal of public reason does not often lead to a general agreement of views, nor should it,&#8221; Rawls writes in <em>Political Liberalism</em>.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-5" href="#footnote-5" target="_self">5</a> &#8220;Citizens learn and profit from conflict and argument, and when their arguments follow public reason, they instruct and deepen society&#8217;s political culture.&#8221;</p><p>Consider that Public Reason&#8217;s mission statement. I hope it&#8217;s one we can bring to life together.</p><p class="button-wrapper" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe now&quot;,&quot;action&quot;:null,&quot;class&quot;:null}" data-component-name="ButtonCreateButton"><a class="button primary" href="https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?"><span>Subscribe now</span></a></p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Two books &#8212; Nancy Bermeo&#8217;s <em>Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times</em> and Larry Bartels&#8217; <em>Democracy Erodes from the Top</em> &#8212; make this case very persuasively in the European context. But it applies pretty well to other cases I&#8217;m familiar with (like the US, Israel, Brazil, India, Venezuela, Turkey and South Korea).</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>Contrary to popular belief, authoritarians face <a href="https://www.vox.com/politics/479924/democracy-us-brazil-south-korea-poland-backsliding-resilience">very real political punishment</a> when people realize their true intentions.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p> Quite a few elected authoritarians seem to be motivated by genuine ideological belief &#8212; I&#8217;d put Modi, Bolsonaro, Yoon Suk Yeol, Hugo Chavez, and even Netanyahu in this category to some degree. Trump may be more venal than anything else, but many of his deputies &#8212; like Stephen Miller, Russ Vought, and even Elon Musk &#8212; have clear ideological commitments. Viktor Orban was fundamentally a kleptocrat, but he built a pretty sophisticated ideological apparatus to defend his regime for a reason &#8212; it was important for winning support both among domestic and global elites.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-4" href="#footnote-anchor-4" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">4</a><div class="footnote-content"><p>You shouldn&#8217;t take &#8220;all&#8221; entirely literally. Rawls recognizes that there will always be some people who reject basic democratic principles, so he restricts the justificatory requirement to all &#8220;reasonable&#8221; citizens. Lots of disagreement among philosophers about how well this works (to put it mildly).</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-5" href="#footnote-anchor-5" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">5</a><div class="footnote-content"><p> Not his most famous book, but the one I think is actually the best and most relevant to our times.</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item><item><title><![CDATA[Trump’s authoritarianism caused the Democratic tsunami]]></title><description><![CDATA[The midterm was about gas prices &#8212; but also something much deeper than that.]]></description><link>https://www.public-reason.com/p/trumps-authoritarianism-caused-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.public-reason.com/p/trumps-authoritarianism-caused-the</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[Zack Beauchamp]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 13:25:17 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://images.unsplash.com/photo-1616141893496-fbc65370493e?crop=entropy&amp;cs=tinysrgb&amp;fit=max&amp;fm=jpg&amp;ixid=M3wzMDAzMzh8MHwxfHNlYXJjaHwyfHx0c3VuYW1pfGVufDB8fHx8MTc5Mzc5NTM4N3ww&amp;ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=80&amp;w=1080" length="0" type="image/jpeg"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="captioned-image-container"><figure><a class="image-link image2 is-viewable-img" target="_blank" href="https://images.unsplash.com/photo-1616141893496-fbc65370493e?crop=entropy&amp;cs=tinysrgb&amp;fit=max&amp;fm=jpg&amp;ixid=M3wzMDAzMzh8MHwxfHNlYXJjaHwyfHx0c3VuYW1pfGVufDB8fHx8MTc5Mzc5NTM4N3ww&amp;ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=80&amp;w=1080" data-component-name="Image2ToDOM"><div class="image2-inset"><picture><source type="image/webp" srcset="https://images.unsplash.com/photo-1616141893496-fbc65370493e?crop=entropy&amp;cs=tinysrgb&amp;fit=max&amp;fm=jpg&amp;ixid=M3wzMDAzMzh8MHwxfHNlYXJjaHwyfHx0c3VuYW1pfGVufDB8fHx8MTc5Mzc5NTM4N3ww&amp;ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=80&amp;w=1080 424w, https://images.unsplash.com/photo-1616141893496-fbc65370493e?crop=entropy&amp;cs=tinysrgb&amp;fit=max&amp;fm=jpg&amp;ixid=M3wzMDAzMzh8MHwxfHNlYXJjaHwyfHx0c3VuYW1pfGVufDB8fHx8MTc5Mzc5NTM4N3ww&amp;ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=80&amp;w=1080 848w, https://images.unsplash.com/photo-1616141893496-fbc65370493e?crop=entropy&amp;cs=tinysrgb&amp;fit=max&amp;fm=jpg&amp;ixid=M3wzMDAzMzh8MHwxfHNlYXJjaHwyfHx0c3VuYW1pfGVufDB8fHx8MTc5Mzc5NTM4N3ww&amp;ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=80&amp;w=1080 1272w, https://images.unsplash.com/photo-1616141893496-fbc65370493e?crop=entropy&amp;cs=tinysrgb&amp;fit=max&amp;fm=jpg&amp;ixid=M3wzMDAzMzh8MHwxfHNlYXJjaHwyfHx0c3VuYW1pfGVufDB8fHx8MTc5Mzc5NTM4N3ww&amp;ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=80&amp;w=1080 1456w" sizes="100vw"><img src="https://images.unsplash.com/photo-1616141893496-fbc65370493e?crop=entropy&amp;cs=tinysrgb&amp;fit=max&amp;fm=jpg&amp;ixid=M3wzMDAzMzh8MHwxfHNlYXJjaHwyfHx0c3VuYW1pfGVufDB8fHx8MTc5Mzc5NTM4N3ww&amp;ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=80&amp;w=1080" width="6720" height="4480" 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srcset="https://images.unsplash.com/photo-1616141893496-fbc65370493e?crop=entropy&amp;cs=tinysrgb&amp;fit=max&amp;fm=jpg&amp;ixid=M3wzMDAzMzh8MHwxfHNlYXJjaHwyfHx0c3VuYW1pfGVufDB8fHx8MTc5Mzc5NTM4N3ww&amp;ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=80&amp;w=1080 424w, https://images.unsplash.com/photo-1616141893496-fbc65370493e?crop=entropy&amp;cs=tinysrgb&amp;fit=max&amp;fm=jpg&amp;ixid=M3wzMDAzMzh8MHwxfHNlYXJjaHwyfHx0c3VuYW1pfGVufDB8fHx8MTc5Mzc5NTM4N3ww&amp;ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=80&amp;w=1080 848w, https://images.unsplash.com/photo-1616141893496-fbc65370493e?crop=entropy&amp;cs=tinysrgb&amp;fit=max&amp;fm=jpg&amp;ixid=M3wzMDAzMzh8MHwxfHNlYXJjaHwyfHx0c3VuYW1pfGVufDB8fHx8MTc5Mzc5NTM4N3ww&amp;ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=80&amp;w=1080 1272w, https://images.unsplash.com/photo-1616141893496-fbc65370493e?crop=entropy&amp;cs=tinysrgb&amp;fit=max&amp;fm=jpg&amp;ixid=M3wzMDAzMzh8MHwxfHNlYXJjaHwyfHx0c3VuYW1pfGVufDB8fHx8MTc5Mzc5NTM4N3ww&amp;ixlib=rb-4.1.0&amp;q=80&amp;w=1080 1456w" sizes="100vw" fetchpriority="high"></picture><div class="image-link-expand"><div class="pencraft pc-display-flex pc-gap-8 pc-reset"><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container restack-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg aria-hidden="true" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 20 20" fill="none" stroke-width="1.5" stroke="var(--color-fg-primary)" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" class="icon-noB79L"><g><path d="M2.53001 7.81595C3.49179 4.73911 6.43281 2.5 9.91173 2.5C13.1684 2.5 15.9537 4.46214 17.0852 7.23684L17.6179 8.67647M17.6179 8.67647L18.5002 4.26471M17.6179 8.67647L13.6473 6.91176M17.4995 12.1841C16.5378 15.2609 13.5967 17.5 10.1178 17.5C6.86118 17.5 4.07589 15.5379 2.94432 12.7632L2.41165 11.3235M2.41165 11.3235L1.5293 15.7353M2.41165 11.3235L6.38224 13.0882"></path></g></svg></button><button class="pencraft pc-reset pencraft icon-container view-image buttonBase-GK1x3M" tabindex="0" type="button"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="20" height="20" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" class="lucide lucide-maximize2 lucide-maximize-2 icon-noB79L"><polyline points="15 3 21 3 21 9"></polyline><polyline points="9 21 3 21 3 15"></polyline><line x1="21" x2="14" y1="3" y2="10"></line><line x1="3" x2="10" y1="21" y2="14"></line></svg></button></div></div></div></a><figcaption class="image-caption">Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@mattpaul">Matt Paul Catalano</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure></div><p>The most fundamental factor behind Democrats&#8217; massive victory last night was this: for the last two years, Donald Trump tried to govern like a strongman while lacking the power needed to actually do it.</p><p>It&#8217;s clear that this election was p<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/exit-poll-trump-midterms-voters-economy-disapproval-rcna607045">rimarily a revolt against Trump</a> &#8212; and, specifically, his flagrant disinterest in actually delivering the cost-of-living improvements he promised in 2024. The <a href="https://x.com/hugolowell/status/2117803546242343001">Iran war</a> is <a href="https://open.substack.com/chat/group/913ec51f-20b8-4f57-a754-26dc0afd9d80?liveblog=true&amp;entry_publication_id=1198116&amp;target_thread_id=9a717932-2fb6-4f63-b08d-614ce8932d45#update-9a717932-2fb6-4f63-b08d-614ce8932d45">the biggest culprit</a>, but corruption and the tariffs seem (among other things) to have mattered.</p><p>These decisions were not one-off mistakes, but the direct product of the authoritarian <em>structure</em> of the second Trump administration: a policymaking process built around <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/20/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-ashley-parker-michael-scherer.html">maximum deference to the president&#8217;s wishes</a> and a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/02/us/trump-courts-judges-orders.html">total disregard for legal constraint</a>. Trump&#8217;s insistence on personal control also <a href="https://www.semafor.com/article/11/02/2026/how-donald-trumps-iron-grip-on-the-republican-party-put-the-senate-in-play">prevented Republicans from running against him in any real way</a>, ensuring that his administration&#8217;s mistakes would drag down the entire party.</p><div class="subscription-widget-wrap-editor" data-attrs="{&quot;url&quot;:&quot;https://www.public-reason.com/subscribe?&quot;,&quot;text&quot;:&quot;Subscribe&quot;,&quot;language&quot;:&quot;en&quot;}" data-component-name="SubscribeWidgetToDOM"><div class="subscription-widget show-subscribe"><div class="preamble"><p class="cta-caption">Public Reason is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></div><form class="subscription-widget-subscribe"><input type="email" class="email-input" name="email" placeholder="Type your email&#8230;" tabindex="-1"><input type="submit" class="button primary" value="Subscribe"><div class="fake-input-wrapper"><div class="fake-input"></div><div class="fake-button"></div></div></form></div></div><p>Were Trump an actual dictator, there would be an easy solution to this problem: rig the election. Trump took <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/doj-elections/689238/?link_source=ta_bluesky_link&amp;taid=6ae95fca401f6f00010d1f61&amp;utm_campaign=the-atlantic&amp;utm_content=edit-promo&amp;utm_medium=social&amp;utm_source=bluesky">several</a> <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/supreme-court-blocks-new-postal-service-mail-ballots-trump/">stabs</a> in <a href="https://www.democracydocket.com/opinion/trumps-gerrymandering-grab-failed-but-the-war-for-democracy-isnt-over/">this direction</a> but he faced an insurmountable level of pushback from courts, states, and civil society activists. The structures of American democracy held, allowing for free and fair elections in which the voters were able to punish the unpopular incumbent.</p><p>Understanding the election in these terms isn&#8217;t just a matter of semantics: it&#8217;s crucial to grasping its implications.</p><p>First, and most importantly, it shows that American democracy is a lot more resilient than is widely appreciated.</p><p>There are very few other countries where an elected strongman has received this kind of decisive rebuke from voters less than two years after launching an authoritarian takeover bid. This is in part a function of Trump&#8217;s own personalist incompetence, but also some pretty deep reservoirs of American democratic strength pushing back on him. That&#8217;s pretty damn great.</p><p>However, the results also augur new conflicts on the horizon &#8212; and potentially a reconfiguration of American politics.</p><p>If you see Trump not as a shellacked president, but a caged authoritarian, then it follows that his most likely reaction will be attempting to break the bars holding him back. Going forward, Republicans will have to decide whether to back him in this and/or how to fashion an identity in a post-Trump world; Democrats will need to commit to do more than just oppose Trump, and develop a new vision for a democracy without the vulnerabilities Trump has exposed.</p><p>All of this &#8212; the extraordinary democratic victory of the midterms, and the new era of American politics we&#8217;ve just entered &#8212; requires a new kind of political coverage. Which is why I&#8217;ve built Public Reason, a new publication on the ideas driving American politics.</p><p>More on what I&#8217;m doing with Public Reason at the end. But for now, let&#8217;s talk about the momentous election that just happened &#8212; and what comes next.</p><h3>The personalism that failed</h3><p>There are many different ways to structure an authoritarian state. But perhaps the most common, <a href="http://foreignaffairs.com/node/1118354">at least nowadays</a>, is &#8220;personalism:&#8221; where power resides with one specific individual rather than, say, a political party or military junta. This person&#8217;s will is dominant, nigh-absolute; there is no check on what they decide, and any subordinate who pushes back too harshly risks ostracism or worse.</p><p>This is how Putin&#8217;s Russia or Erdogan&#8217;s Turkey works &#8212; and it&#8217;s also basically the Trump model in America.</p><p>Since 2016, he has hollowed out the Republican party, purging anyone willing to challenge his leadership too aggressively. His victories in 2024 solidified this control, which he then attempted to port over to actual policymaking. His first moves in 2025 were aimed at removing checks on executive discretion, including removing career civil servants who might push back on legally dubious orders.</p><p>His immediate subordinates all understood the assignment. In one remarkable anecdote, relayed by <em><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/20/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-ashley-parker-michael-scherer.html">The Atlantic</a></em><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/20/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-ashley-parker-michael-scherer.html">&#8217;s Ashley Parker</a>, a Trump staffer said they have an unofficial rule that whenever Trump tells them to do something twice, they execute on it immediately. Why twice?</p><p>&#8220;Well, to be fair, he does say a lot of crazy things, but if he says it a second time, we know he&#8217;s serious,&#8221; the subordinate said (in Parker&#8217;s paraphrase). &#8220;We know &#8212; regardless of whether it&#8217;s to fire the board of the Kennedy Center and take it over or to potentially march on Greenland &#8212; if that&#8217;s what he wants, we are there to make that happen.&#8221;</p><p>But the problem with personalism, one well-documented by political scientists, is that it tends to produce really bad policy. When one man is making decisions without any serious challenge, he often acts on biased information or personal whim.</p><p>Sometimes, the output is ridiculous &#8212; like when the Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov renamed all the days of the week and months of the year.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-1" href="#footnote-1" target="_self">1</a> Other times, it&#8217;s disastrous &#8212; as with <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/personalist-global-order">Putin&#8217;s 2022 decision to invade Ukraine</a>.</p><p>Trump&#8217;s second term has seen a mix of both the ridiculous and the disastrous. His strange obsession with Canada led to a trade war no one else really wanted. He wanted more tariffs, so his staff hastily threw together a new regime that imposed duties on <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/apr/03/donald-trump-tariffs-antarctica-uninhabited-heard-mcdonald-islands">Antarctic islands mostly populated by penguins</a>. He hated Jimmy Kimmel, so the FCC tried to silence him. He wanted to renovate the White House, so the East Wing got torn down.</p><p>But the most fateful personalist decision was the war in Iran. In their book <em>Regime Change</em>, the New York Times&#8217; Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan describe a situation where Trump basically decided that the war would be quick, easy, and decisive &#8212; and while many of his subordinates had misgivings, no one dared forcefully push back.</p><p>The result is, by all accounts, the single most politically significant disaster of the second administration. Not only did the war drag on indefinitely, but it meaningfully contributed to rising prices &#8212; which was, again, <a href="https://x.com/AsteadWH/status/2117363735668887612">the number one thing</a> that swing voters elected Trump to solve back in 2024. There is no way to explain the spate of Democratic Senate victories in red states like Kansas, Iowa, and South Carolina &#8212; or the <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2026/11/04/texas-democrats-blue-wave/">full Democratic takeover of Texas</a> &#8212; without it. </p><p>&#8220;I think a part of [the GOP defeat] was Iran,&#8221; Trump admitted in <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-acknowledges-iran-played-role-republican-midterm-losses-2026-11-04/">a Fox News interview</a> last night.</p><h3>America is still democratic</h3><p>Since the early days of the second Trump administration, I&#8217;ve had a friendly disagreement with Steven Levitsky &#8212; a Harvard political scientist and one of America&#8217;s leading experts on comparative democracy.</p><p>Levitsky thinks that democracy in the United States <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/1001893">collapsed swiftly after Trump took office</a>. The president&#8217;s pervasive abuse of power, attacks on key democratic institutions, and efforts to tilt the electoral playing field in his direction cumulatively pushed the US over the line into a kind of authoritarian rule.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-2" href="#footnote-2" target="_self">2</a> I think that the continued viability of the political opposition, the persistence of free and fair elections, and the general ineffectiveness of Trump&#8217;s efforts to repress his opponents mean that <a href="https://www-vox-com.zproxy.org/politics/485278/democracy-reports-america-trump-2025">the US remained within the democratic family</a> &#8212; albeit in much-weakened form.</p><p>It would be cheap to argue that the midterms proved me right: Democrats just won in a rout, so the US definitionally can&#8217;t be under authoritarian rule. But an election loss isn&#8217;t, in and of itself, proof that the prior regime was democratic. Viktor Orb&#225;n built what was <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/9/13/17823488/hungary-democracy-authoritarianism-trump">undoubtedly an authoritarian regime in Hungary</a>, and he was ousted in an election earlier this year.</p><p>Yet the Hungary comparison is revealing &#8212; showing both the resilience of American democracy and why Trump&#8217;s personalism backfired so badly.</p><p>In the first election Orb&#225;n faced after his authoritarian takeover, held in 2014, his Fidesz party maintained its two-thirds of seats in parliament despite losing about 7 points in the popular vote. The party would maintain its stranglehold for 12 years after that, reflecting an authoritarian regime that was increasingly adept at fragmenting and repressing the opposition. Their defeat this year was, according to opposition leader Peter Magyar, <a href="https://www.rev.com/transcripts/peter-magyar-speaks-after-winning-hungary-election">more a regime change than ordinary election</a>.</p><p>The 2026 midterm, by contrast, was in some ways the textbook definition of an ordinary American midterm. The president&#8217;s party almost always loses seats in midterms; Trump was unusually unpopular, thanks to his bad policy choices, so he lost more than normal.</p><p>Had Trump been as effective an authoritarian as Orb&#225;n, he would have been able to compromise the midterms. Indeed, he <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/11/doj-elections/689238/">certainly tried</a>: Trump made an unprecedented push for mid-cycle gerrymandering, a tactic <a href="https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/how-viktor-orban-wins/">vital to Orb&#225;n&#8217;s grip on power</a>. Trump demanded that states turn over their voter rolls to him, arrested over 100 people on voter fraud charges, sued to nullify the Alaska Senate race, and even tried to use the Post Office to blow up mail voting.</p><p>These schemes all failed. Even by <a href="https://www.democracydocket.com/opinion/trumps-gerrymandering-grab-failed-but-the-war-for-democracy-isnt-over/">Democratic estimates</a>, which you&#8217;d think would inflate the danger, Trump&#8217;s gerrymanders were <a href="https://x.com/JakeSherman/status/2117826503903793544">wildly ineffective</a> in the face of the blue tsunami. States refused to hand over their voter rolls, beating Trump&#8217;s attempts to force them in court <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/c344ed8a-4e4b-43f8-a570-d8101864d929?sharetype=blocked&amp;syn-25a6b1a6=1">by a 27-0 margin</a>. The fraud arrests had no discernible impact on voting, and <a href="https://www.npr.org/2026/11/01/nx-s1-6023766/doj-alaska-lawsuit-senate-race-dan-sullivan">a federal judge blocked the Alaska gambit</a>. The Supreme Court blocked the mail-in balloting scheme <a href="https://theconversation.com/why-the-supreme-court-blocked-trump-and-the-postal-service-from-restricting-mail-in-voting-for-the-midterms-291319">in a 7-2 ruling</a>, meaning that a majority of the court&#8217;s <em>conservatives</em> sided against the president.</p><p>This has been pretty much the norm for Trump&#8217;s power grabs. They&#8217;ve had a number of extremely damaging effects, both on the quality of American democracy and the world writ large, but failed to significantly marginalize opposing forces or majorly rig the actual voting process. That&#8217;s why <a href="https://www.vox.com/politics/410966/trump-democracy-100-days-losing">I&#8217;ve long argued</a> that Trump&#8217;s authoritarian bid would likely fail.<a class="footnote-anchor" data-component-name="FootnoteAnchorToDOM" id="footnote-anchor-3" href="#footnote-3" target="_self">3</a></p><p>Combine that with Trump&#8217;s insistence on destructive personalist rule, and Republicans were always going to have a catastrophic midterm like last night&#8217;s.</p><h3>What comes next</h3><p>In policy terms, the midterm outcome is hugely significant. Trump won&#8217;t be able to use Congress to consolidate power, and he&#8217;ll face a deluge of investigations and subpoenas that will take up his attention and likely expose some politically damaging stuff.</p><p>But &#8212; and this is a point on which Levitsky and I emphatically agree &#8212; the lesson here should not be that American democracy is safe and undamaged. Far from it.</p><p>First, we don&#8217;t know how hard the president will fight the results. According to Trump, he has never lost an election; every defeat has been the result of fraud or theft. So far, his reaction has been surprisingly muted (at least, by his standards). If he reverse to form, it could lead to a dangerous and destabilizing showdown.</p><p>Second, we don&#8217;t know what lessons Republicans and Democrats will take from the results.</p><p>Will Republicans finally break not only with lame-duck Trump, but the entire authoritarian turn he initiated? Will they conclude that they simply didn&#8217;t MAGA hard enough, and double down? Or, as I think is most likely, will there be a vicious and protracted internal struggle over which of the many of the Trump right visions will triumph?</p><p>Will Democrats, for their part, conclude that they&#8217;ve received a voter mandate &#8212; and ignore the clear signs that it was mostly a negative vote against Republicans rather than an affirmative vote for their agenda? Will they think seriously about the structural changes needed to shore up American democracy against a similar assault, or about how to build a new liberal moral compact that could knit together a fraying polity?</p><p>No one knows the answer to these questions for certain. But those answers will be determined not just by the ordinary push-and-pull of politics, but by the deeper ideas and beliefs influencing both sides of the debate.</p><p>I&#8217;m launching Public Reason because I want to build <em>the</em> place for tracking those intellectual currents.</p><p>After 11 years, the Trump era in American politics is coming to a close. What follows is as yet unclear. In this chaotic environment, new and previously sidelined ideas could move to the center of our political life. Indeed, the idea of turning the presidency into a personalist pseudo-dictatorship was widely seen as crackpot even after Trump&#8217;s first term  &#8212; yet it just happened.</p><p>I&#8217;m going to give you pieces like this one, assessing the fundamental forces shaping the future of both American and global democracy. I&#8217;m going to examine the crisis of liberalism at the philosophical level, looking at why it&#8217;s in trouble and how it might be reimagined. And I&#8217;m going to give you deep dives into the wildest, most interesting ideas shaping the internal conversation across and inside of America&#8217;s major political factions, from arguments over the alleged decline of America&#8217;s collective morality to Elon Musk&#8217;s deeply weird thoughts about the future of the planet.</p><p>If you&#8217;re interested in any of this, you&#8217;ve got an opportunity to get in on the Public Reason ground floor &#8212; to presubscribe before our full launch this coming Monday. If you do, you get a 20 percent discount on your monthly subscription fee, which buys you access to Public Reason&#8217;s paywalled essays and its comment section.</p><p>It&#8217;s a scary time in the world &#8212; but also, in some ways, an exciting one. I hope we&#8217;ll be able to go through it together.</p><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-1" href="#footnote-anchor-1" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">1</a><div class="footnote-content"><p> He also renamed himself &#8220;T&#252;rkmenba&#351;y,&#8221; which translates as &#8220;Leader of the Turkmens,&#8221; and then renamed the city of Krasnovodsk after his new name. Weird guy.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-2" href="#footnote-anchor-2" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">2</a><div class="footnote-content"><p> Levitsky and his coauthor, University of Toronto&#8217;s Lucan Way, describe the US as being a &#8220;<a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/17196">competitive authoritarian&#8221;</a> state &#8212; which is, to simplify somewhat, an authoritarian state where elections remain competitive in some sense but are meaningfully tilted in the ruling party&#8217;s direction.</p></div></div><div class="footnote" data-component-name="FootnoteToDOM"><a id="footnote-3" href="#footnote-anchor-3" class="footnote-number" contenteditable="false" target="_self">3</a><div class="footnote-content"><p> Levitsky and Way come to a similar, but slightly different conclusion &#8212; that Trump&#8217;s has built an authoritarian regime, but he will fail to <em>consolidate</em> it (which means establish as something lasting).</p></div></div>]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>